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This anthology focuses on what the editors describe as "thir-
teen famous Supreme Court cases and the enduring questions of 
civil liberties that they raise." For each case Professors Phelps and 
Poirier have provided their own introduction, followed by two 
scholarly essays, one supporting and the other opposing "the cen-
tral proposition posed by the case." 
As one might expect in a work designed for adoption by other 
teachers, they have chosen obvious cases: for religious liberty, En-
gel v. Vitale and Yoder v. Wisconsin; for freedom of speech, Schenck 
v. United States, Miller v. California, New York Times v. Sullivan, 
and Zurcher v. Stanford Daily; for criminal procedure, Miranda v. 
Arizona, Mapp v. Ohio, and Gregg v. Georgia; for equal protection, 
Regents v. Bakke, Frontiero v. Richardson, and San Antonio v. Rod-
riguez; and the abortion case of Roe v. Wade. Their choice of essays 
is also defensible. They assist the reader in joining the debate on 
these cases by pairing, for example, Alexander Bickel with Hans 
Linde on the clear and present danger doctrine; Irving Kristol with 
Walter Gellhorn on censorship; Abe Fortas with Ernest van den 
Haag on the death penalty; Henry Abraham with John Livingston 
on reverse discrimination; Thomas Emerson with Paul Freund on 
the Equal Rights Amendment; and Frank Michelman with Ralph 
Winter on economic discrimination. 
A case can be made that the editors should have selected other 
decisions (for example, Bates v. Arizona and the important question 
of the constitutional protections to be afforded to commercial 
speech) or different essays (Steven Schlesinger's writings on the ex-
clusionary rule, law review articles by John Hart Ely or Terrance 
Sandalow on reverse discrimination, and selections from Robert 
Cord or Michael Malbin on the establishment clause come immedi-
ately to mind). Such criticism, however, amounts to little more 
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than a complaint that Phelps and Poirier did not edit the book that 
the reviewer would have edited. Their choice of cases and essays is 
defensible, and their anthology generally succeeds on that level. 
Nevertheless, the book fails on a more fundamental level. It 
does not achieve the editors' explicit objective in undertaking this 
project in the first place. They lament that "students usually lack 
sufficient ammunition in their intellectual arsenals to go beyond 
general assumptions" and announce that their objective is to "arm 
readers with the kinds of evidence and reasoning helpful to a resolu-
tion" of some of the enduring constitutional questions in civil liber-
ties. However, what they arm the reader with-at least in their 
introductory essays-is a bag of cliches to sling harmlessly at the 
dominant general assumptions of today's constitutional jurispru-
dence. For example, they assert without elaboration that the Decla-
ration of Independence is an inappropriate source of instruction on 
the meaning of equality or the equal protection clause because the 
framers believed that "it was not mankind that was created equal 
but men." They would thereby deprive us of the guidance provided 
by what Abraham Lincoln called the "father of all moral principle 
among us" as we address the vexing questions of racial, sexual, and 
economic discrimination. Likewise, the editors suggest that regu-
lating obscenity and pornography has become increasingly difficult 
because of the public's demand for "more sophisticated entertain-
ment," thereby implying that those who favor antipornography 
laws are unsophisticated. With equal superficiality, they summarily 
dismiss the "bad tendency" test in free speech and press cases. Why 
not arm readers with the fact that a prominent contemporary jurist 
(Robert Bork) has embraced this test? Or that President Lincoln 
relied on a similar notion when he queried: "Must I shoot a simple-
minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a 
wiley agitator who induces him to desert?"4 
The problem is not hard to discern: Professors Phelps and Poi-
rier, though they aspire to equip students to challenge orthodoxy, 
are themselves captives of the prevalent jurisprudential assump-
tions. As a consequence, they tend more to fortify than to challenge 
the conventional wisdom. 
One tacit assumption of contemporary constitutional jurispru-
dence is the belief that rights and liberties are protected only by the 
Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment and that the Constitu-
tion itself-because of the powers it confers-is a threat to these 
rights and liberties. Professor Gerald Gunther's Constitutional Law 
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casebook is illustrative. After introducing the judicial function, 
Professor Gunther divides the recently-published eleventh edition 
of his widely used and respected work into two parts: The Structure 
of Government: Nation and States in the Federal System, which fo-
cuses exclusively on the way powers are distributed by the original 
Constitution; and Individual Rights, which addresses only its 
amendments. Gunther is not alone; the same can be said of other 
casebooks, as well as of C. Herman Pritchett's American Constitu-
tion. For decades, graduate students in political science have pre-
pared for their qualifying examinations in constitutional law by 
studying this influential and popular treatise, which includes a 
chapter entitled The Constitutional Basis for Protection of Individual 
Rights. The reader quickly learns that the basis of individual rights 
is not the Constitution itself but the Bill of Rights and the four-
teenth amendment. The implication in Pritchett as well as in Gun-
ther is clear: the original Constitution affords no protection to 
individual rights and is, in fact, deficient in this respect, inasmuch 
as amendments have been necessary to secure these rights. 
Modern constitutional jurisprudence implicitly rejects the 
proud claim of The Federalist No. 84 that the constitution is "in 
every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, a bill of rights." 
Of course, there's nothing wrong with believing that Hamilton was 
mistaken and a Bill of Rights was indeed necessary. The assump-
tion that needs to be challenged is the idea that the distribution of 
power in the original Constitution has little or nothing to do with 
securing individual liberty. Phelps and Poirier fail to arm their 
readers with the reasoning of, for example, the second Justice 
Harlan, who repeatedly reminded us that liberty is secured not by 
the "parchment barriers" of the Bill of Rights but rather by the 
Constitution's political principles and institutional arrangements. 
As he declared in 1964: "We are accustomed to speak of the Bill of 
Rights ... as the principal guarantee of personal liberty. Yet it 
would surely be shallow not to recognize that the structure of our 
political system accounts no less for the free society we have. [The 
Framers] staked their faith that liberty would prosper in the new 
nation not primarily upon declaration of individual rights but upon 
the kind of government the Union was to have."5 
Madison, of course, was the principal sponsor in the first Con-
gress of a series of amendments that when ratified became the Bill of 
Rights. Once he had secured congressional approval of these 
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amendments, he proposed to his colleagues that they be incorpo-
rated into the body of the Constitution itself. He declared that 
"there is a neatness and propriety in incorporating the amendments 
into the Constitution itself; in that case, the system will remain uni-
form and entire; it will certainly be more simple when the amend-
ments are interwoven into those parts to which they naturally 
belong. "6 He saw no tension between the original Constitution and 
these amendments; rather he saw the latter as "expressly declar[ing] 
the great rights of mankind secured" under the former.7 The Con-
stitution and the Bill of Rights had, he believed, the same objective, 
and he saw no need to introduce a distinction between them, which 
he believed placing the amendments elsewhere would do. While 
Madison generally had his way concerning the Bill of Rights, on 
this particular matter he did not. s Roger Sherman argued that the 
amendments should be added at the end of the Constitution-to 
attempt to "interweave" them into the Constitution itself would, he 
declared, "be destructive of the whole fabric. We might as well en-
deavor to mix brass, iron, and clay .... "9 George Clymer agreed; 
he argued that the amendments should be kept separate so that the 
Constitution "would remain a monument to justify those who made 
it; by a comparison, the world would discover the perfection of the 
original, and the superfluity of the amendments."w 
The Congress ultimately agreed with Sherman and Clymer, but 
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the results have not been what Clymer predicted. By placing the 
amendments at the tail of the Constitution, a significance has been 
given to the Bill of Rights that neither Madison nor the other mem-
bers of Congress intended. Madison regarded the Constitution as 
the fundamental protector of rights and liberties, securing them 
from the threats of too much governmental power (tyranny) and 
too little (imbecility and anarchy). He also viewed the Bill of 
Rights as expressly declaring the rights that the Constitution se-
cured. In contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, however, the 
Bill of Rights tail has come to wag the constitutional dog. Clymer's 
reason for appending the amendments at the end of the Constitu-
tion has been turned on its head, with the original Constitution now 
assumed to be "superfluous"-if not an actual threat-to the pro-
tection of rights and with "perfection" now ascribed to the Bill of 
Rights-or more specifically, to activist judges interpreting (or bet-
ter, "noninterpreting") its provisions. Since Phelps and Poirier 
share this assumption as well, they provide their readers with no 
evidence or reasons to take the original Constitution seriously or to 
trust in its principles and institutional contrivances for our political 
salvation. 
Another assumption of contemporary constitutional jurispru-
dence is the legitimacy of the incorporation doctrine. With the ex-
ceptions of Schenck v. United States and the equal protection cases, 
every case included in this anthology has significance only because 
of the incorporation doctrine. Yet while the editors briefly allude to 
incorporation in their discussion of Miranda, they never arm their 
readers with the fact that these cases raise what the editors consider 
to be "enduring constitutional questions" only because the Supreme 
Court has held that the fourteenth amendment incorporates partic-
ular provisions of the Bill of Rights, thereby making them applica-
ble to the states. They never add to the reader's "intellectual 
arsenal" evidence that Wisconsin's mandatory school attendance 
law, New York State's Regents Prayer, or California's anti-obscen-
ity statute pose no enduring constitutional problem unless and until 
the first amendment is understood to apply to the states. Phelps 
and Poirier take it for granted that the first amendment applies to 
the states, no doubt because they uncritically embrace still another 
dominant general assumption of contemporary constitutional juris-
prudence: that the Constitution is simply what the Court says it is. 
While the question of the proper role of the Court is central to 
the debate over "the role of rights and liberties in a democratic soci-
ety," Phelps and Poirier never so much as allude to it-the judicial 
legislation of Miranda v. Arizona passes unobserved, as does the tre-
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mendous potential for judicial activism that ratification of the Equal 
Rights Amendment would have created. In their discussion of 
Frontiero and the Equal Rights Amendment, the editors describe 
those who sought to achieve the goals of the ERA not through the 
formal amendment process of Article V but through judicial poli-
cymaking as "constitutional purists." That strange description at-
tests to how fully the editors have succumbed to the dominant 
assumptions of constitutional jurisprudence. It also encapsulates 
the reason their book fails to achieve its stated objective of arming 
readers with evidence and reasoning to think about the hard ques-
tions of civil liberties. By attributing constitutional purity to those 
who would dispense with the Constitution, Phelps and Poirier not 
only display a contempt for the Constitution but provide evidence 
that they lack the ammunition to augment any reader's intellectual 
arsenal. 
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In Protesters on Trial, Professor Barkan addresses the relations 
between protest movements and the legal system. He focuses on the 
impact that legal procedure (in particular criminal prosecutions) 
had on two key social movements (southern civil rights and Viet-
nam antiwar). "To what degree, and under what conditions," he 
asks, "may the law and legal order serve as vehicles of harassment 
of social movements or, conversely, aid their efforts to change the 
status quo?" By showing how various factors (such as protester 
needs and the strategies of officials) affect litigation strategies of de-
fendants and the movements they endorse, Barkan shows how the 
rule of law is also a force in its own right which legal authorities 
may deploy to achieve other than neutral ends. 
Two types of trials are important to the "resource mobiliza-
tion" of protest groups: trials in which the defense simply seeks 
acquittal using normal legalistic defenses, and political trials in 
which the defense seeks publicity. In political trials, use of defense 
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